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Abstract This paper deals with the impact of voluntary strategy disclosure in
management reports on the cost of equity capital. Such an impact is not obvious, as
investors might consider strategy information as ‘‘cheap talk’’ and therefore ignore
it. We analyze a sample of 100 German listed firms from 2002 to 2008, measuring
strategy disclosure levels using hand-collected strategy disclosure scores. We find
that higher disclosure levels are, on average, associated with lower cost of equity
capital even after controlling for overall disclosure quality. The paper contributes to
the field by providing evidence that voluntary strategy disclosures in firms’ man-
agement reports reduce the information asymmetry component of cost of capital and
therefore can be considered as a relevant source of information for investors.
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1 Introduction
A major issue in accounting research is the question of why managers should choose
to share internal business information with investors (Healy and Palepu 2001). Our
research applies to this context and focuses on the impact of voluntary strategy
disclosure on firms’ cost of equity capital.
A comprehensive disclosure of strategy information essentially encompasses
prognostic information on businesses, strategic objectives, the resulting business
strategies, and implementation priorities (Thompson and Strickland 2003). From an
investor decision-making perspective, these insights into a firm’s business strategies
are of considerable relevance as they shed light on long-term managerial actions.
Strategy disclosure therefore constitutes a key element in linking historical
information presented in the financial statements to prospective cash flow
forecasting (e.g., Barron et al. 1999).
Still, it is questionable whether investors really use voluntary strategy disclosure
for decision-making purposes, as such information is often not verifiable and thus
not necessarily credible. For example, whereas ex-ante information on a firm’s
intended strategy is largely non-financial and describes management’s projected
course of action, the ex-post information on strategy realization is mainly reflected
by short-term financial results. Additionally, strategy implementation is subject to
ad hoc reviews, if major environmental or intra-firm parameters change (Kachaner
and Deimler 2008). Consequently, the two types of financial and non-financial
information do not match structurally, so that verifying the implementation of
announced strategies is not at all a straightforward task. If investors were to assume
that forward-looking communication on strategy is costless as well as non-binding,
they would then interpret such disclosures as not credible and rather as ‘cheap talk’
(Crawford and Sobel 1982). In such cases, information on strategy would only be
used by investors under very restrictive conditions, e.g., if strategy disclosures were
perceived as inducing proprietary costs on the firm side through damaging its
competitive position in product markets (Verrecchia 1983; Gigler 1994).
Thus, our research question is whether voluntary strategy disclosures provide useful
information for investor decision-making. We examine this issue by relating the level of
firms’ voluntary strategy disclosure to (a) the cost of equity capital and (b) to bid–ask
spreads and trading volumes as complementary measures, which also relate to investor
decision-making. To assess the level of strategy disclosure, we use self-constructed
strategy disclosure scores (SDS) as a measurement instrument. Our sample comprises
100 listed German firms between 2002 and 2008 (resulting in 700 firm-year
observations). Our measurement of strategy disclosure levels focuses on the manage-
ment report (‘Lagebericht’), as under German accounting regulation [par. 264 (1), 315a
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HGB], the management report is the sole platform in which firms embed—albeit
voluntarily—strategy disclosures as part of the mandatory annual financial reporting
package (Baetge et al. 2013). Given that the management report is subject to the
compulsory audit of annual financial statements, the auditor’s examination of strategy
disclosure provides a third-party validation that potentially enhances credibility.
We find evidence that an increased level of voluntary strategy disclosure in the
management report is indeed on average associated with lower cost of equity capital,
lower bid–ask spreads and higher trading volumes. Our results are robust to a variety of
sensitivity tests concerning variable measurement as well as estimation procedures. A
further analysis also indicates the incremental information content of strategy disclosures
(Biddle et al. 1995), compared to other parts of the financial reporting package.
Our paper is embedded into the empirical literature on voluntary disclosure in
financial accounting and its impact on investor decision-making (e.g., Botosan
1997; Hail 2002; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Healy and Palepu 2001; Botosan 2006;
Daske 2006; Gu and Li 2007; Leuz and Wysocki 2008 or Glaum et al. 2011).
Whereas this literature provides broad, though not unanimous evidence that an
increase in credible voluntary disclosure is associated with a decreasing cost of
equity capital and other, related measures, there is still a research gap regarding the
impact of voluntary disclosures on strategy. This is not obvious per se due to the
qualitative, prospective and subjective nature of strategy information.
Our study therefore extends the existing empirical literature on voluntary
disclosure in several respects. First, we analyze specifically whether information on
a firm’s strategy provided in the management report is on average useful for
investors. Second, our paper adds to the literature on mechanisms for enhancing the
credibility of voluntary disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001), by using voluntary
strategy disclosures provided in the management report as a part of the firm’s
mandatory annual financial reporting package in Germany. Third, we not only use
the cost of equity capital to find evidence of an impact of increased voluntary
strategy disclosure on investor decision-making, but validate our analysis using bid–
ask spreads and trading volumes as complementary measures.
Therefore, the contribution of our study is twofold. On the one hand, our results
suggest the acquisition of private benefits if firms use the management report for
communicating strategy information to investors. For example, in line with Dhaliwal
et al. (2011), firms can augment their level of strategy disclosure to enhance market
value, e.g., in advance of an intended increase of equity capital. Even though our study
does not deal with the specific content of firms’ strategies, but only with the level of
comprehensiveness of strategy disclosure per se, our results indicate that firms which
communicate their strategy more thoroughly on average enjoy advantages with respect
to cost of equity capital, compared to firms that tend to conceal their intended strategies.
On the other hand, the benefit of providing useful and credible strategy
information in the management report may not only be private to the disclosing
firms’ in question, but could also have social value. For example, Lambert et al.
(2007) provide a model in which they analyze the relationship between increased
disclosure and stock returns, under the assumption that there are multiple firms
whose cash flows are correlated. They show that, in such a setting, disclosure not
only has an impact on the CAPM beta as determinant of a single firm’s cost of
Business Research (2014) 7:263–312 265
123
equity capital, but may also reduce the market-risk premium and thus provide
positive externalities for other firms as well.
In this context, our study contributes to the debate on the extent of mandatory
information that should be provided in a firm’s financial reporting package (e.g.,
Dye 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer 2000). Even though regulators and standard-
setting bodies consider strategy disclosure as highly relevant information (Gu and Li
2007), it has not yet been made mandatory under either German GAAP or under
IFRS (for details on the regulatory environment in Germany, see ‘‘Appendix 1’’).
While our results do not indicate whether evidence of such externalities exists and/
or whether they are outweighed by negative consequences, they could still be used
as a further argument for standard-setters at least to continue debating whether to
require mandatory strategy disclosure.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we review the
literature on related research questions. In Sect. 3, we develop our hypotheses and in
Sect. 4, we describe the sample selection procedure as well as the sample
characteristics. In Sect. 5, we specify our empirical model and the measurement of
all variables employed. In Sect. 6, we present the empirical results. Section 7
contains robustness checks and further analysis. Section 8 concludes with a short
summary and discussion.
2 Literature review
Our paper is related to other studies on the impact of increased disclosure levels
either in general or in the management report or with respect to comparable parts of
the financial reporting package on investor decision-making.
Botosan (1997) provides a seminal study examining the relationship between a
self-constructed annual report disclosure score and the cost of equity capital. She
finds evidence of the hypothesized negative association of both variables, but only
for firms with low analyst followings. Additionally, her analysis is limited to only
one industry and one year. In a subsequent study, Hail (2002) also provides
evidence of a negative association between disclosure quality in general and the cost
of equity capital, using a sample of 73 Swiss firms. Petrova et al. (2012) confirmed
this notion for another sample of 121 listed Swiss firms. Comparably, Urquiza et al.
(2012) find, for a sample of 36 Spanish firms, that forward-looking information in
the annual report is associated with a decrease in the cost of equity capital.
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) use the choice of accounting standard (IFRS and/or
US-GAAP vs. German GAAP) as a proxy for disclosure level and find evidence of a
hypothesized association with bid–ask spreads and trading volumes. Gassen and
Sellhorn (2006) also find smaller bid–ask spreads for German firms adopting IFRS
from 1998 to 2004, even though volatility increases. On the other hand, Daske
(2006) finds either unchanged or even increasing cost of capital, after international
GAAP adoption in German firms, for a sampling period from 1993 to 2002. In a
similar vein, Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) do not find any cost of equity capital
effects for a sample of 133 firms voluntarily adopting non-local GAAP within the
European Union in 1999. Finally, Gru¨ning (2011) provides mixed evidence, finding
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higher disclosure levels to be associated with increased share turnover, smaller bid–
ask spreads and increased market capitalization, but no direct association with cost
of equity capital for 556 German Prime Standard firms in 2006.
In contrast to these papers addressing disclosure levels rather generally, our study
focuses explicitly on the voluntary disclosure of strategy information. This relates
for example to Barron et al. (1999) who provide an in-depth analysis of the effects
of overall MD&A quality on analysts’ earnings forecasts. They find that high
MD&A quality is negatively associated with forecast error and/or dispersion.
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) extend these results to corporate non-financial disclosures.
They observe that higher levels of forward-looking disclosures lead to increased
forecast accuracy. Glaum et al. (2011) also use analysts’ earnings forecasts as the
dependent variable and associate it with the introduction of international accounting
standards and disclosure quality in the notes, as well as in the management report.
They find that disclosure quality in the notes has a positive association with forecast
error, whereas disclosure quality in the management report has not.
Richardson and Welker (2001) analyze the incremental cost of equity capital
effects of voluntary social disclosures and find a positive relationship, even though
financially successful firms seem to be penalized less for social disclosures.
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), on the other hand, establish a negative association between
corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and cost of equity capital. They also
find that firms tend to exploit this effect by raising equity capital after initiating CSR
activities.
Gu and Li (2007) analyze the association of voluntary innovation strategy
disclosure by high-tech firms and find on average positive stock price reactions
following disclosure. Due to their specific focus, their results not only refer to the
amount of disclosure given, but also to innovation strategy as specifically disclosed
information. Finally, Knauer et al. (2012) provide evidence that voluntary forecast
disclosures have an impact on share price, which increases with growing forecast
reliability.
Overall, our literature review shows that the existing empirical studies on the
association of voluntary disclosure with cost of equity capital have generated mixed
results, regardless of whether disclosure has been measured by either archival or
hand-collected data. One reason might be that sometimes voluntary disclosure
represents non-verifiable and non-binding information thus constituting ‘cheap talk’
(Crawford and Sobel 1982; Farrell and Gibbons 1989; Korn et al. 2002). Glaum and
Friedrich (2006: 166) cite analysts doubting the information value of the
management report ‘‘…because most companies would always display their
situation as positive’’. Gu and Li (2007) find that the association of voluntary
disclosure on innovation strategy provided by high-tech firms with cost of equity
capital is higher if this information is given credibility by preceding insider trading
as a confirmatory signal, i.e., if cheap talk is less relevant. Dobler (2008) relates
cheap talk in financial reporting information to unverified risk reporting issues.
Finally, Bozzolan et al. (2009) provide evidence that verifiable information has a
higher impact on analysts’ forecasts, in comparison to non-verifiable information.
In our paper, we address the issue of cheap talk by focusing on strategy
disclosures provided in the German management report as a mandatory part of the
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annual financial reporting package. Even though the management report under
German regulation does not mandate strategy reporting (for details, see
‘‘Appendix 1’’), its principles still require any information included in the
management report to be complete, reliable, clear, and transparent, as well as
conveying management’s perspective. Moreover, any information provided in the
management report—albeit on a voluntary basis—is subject to the compulsory audit
of the annual financial statements. Within the scope of the legal mandate, an auditor
examines whether the management report is consistent with the financial statements
as well as the findings of the audit, and whether, as a whole, it provides a realistic
view of the firm’s position and also appropriately presents opportunities and risks
associated with future development [par. 317 (2) HGB]. Such third-party validation
tends to increase the credibility of strategy disclosures (Healy and Palepu 2001),
simultaneously reducing potential for cheap talk.
3 Hypothesis development
Disclosure theory presupposes that investors benefit from voluntary information that
is provided above and beyond mandatory disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000;
Hail 2002). In order to study the effect of voluntary strategy disclosure on cost of
equity capital, our research is building on three related strands of literature.
First, revolving around the seminal analysis of Barry and Brown (1985),
literature drawing on portfolio choice and equilibrium asset pricing theory suggests
that increased disclosure reduces estimation risk arising from investor estimates of
key parameters of an asset’s payoff distribution (‘estimation-risk approach’). Since
there is greater uncertainty regarding ‘true’ parameters when information provided
is low, investors require compensation for this additional risk (Barry and Brown
1985; Coles and Loewenstein 1988; Coles et al. 1995 or Clarkson et al. 1996). If
strategy disclosure is informative to investors with respect to an asset’s payoff
function, increased levels of strategy disclosure for a given firm should then be
associated with lower cost of equity capital. A more recent analysis by Lambert
et al. (2007) extends this literature stream by using a model that allows explicitly for
multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated. They show that increased disclosure
also reduces the covariance between firms’ cash flow estimates as part of non-
diversifiable risk. Thus, in addition to lowering a firm’s beta, increased disclosure
also reduces the market premium and therefore creates a positive externality.
A second stream of related research builds on the seminal work of Merton (1987)
and O’Hara (1995), dealing with the impact of information asymmetry amongst
investors on the cost of capital (‘market-microstructure approach’). As uninformed
investors bear an increased risk of misconstructing their portfolios compared to
informed investors, they require compensation for this risk (Easley and O’Hara
2004). Empirical results supporting a positive association between information
asymmetry amongst investors and the cost of equity capital are provide, for
instance, by Easley et al. (2002), Copeland et al. (2009), or Bhattacharya et al.
(2012). Thus, with regard to strategy disclosures, the expected duration of
information dissipation amongst investors may be considerably longer if firms do
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not use the management report as a standard information channel, but rather an
unsystematic and broad multitude of—sometimes not well monitored—information
channels (Merton 1987), like analyst conferences, newspaper interviews, websites
and/or firm brochures.
Both the estimation-risk approach and the market-microstructure approach
suggest a direct link between increased disclosure levels in the management report
and a decreased cost of equity capital. This should hold particularly true for strategy
information provided in a management report.
A third stream of literature puts the focus on enhanced market liquidity resulting
from more comprehensive firm disclosures, either through decreased transaction
costs or an increased demand for a firm’s shares (‘market-liquidity approach’, e.g.,
Demsetz 1968; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991 or
Baiman and Verrecchia 1996). As Verrecchia (1999: 282) points out, ‘‘in the
absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, the conventional wisdom is that
more disclosure results in more liquid markets.’’ Higher market liquidity can be
associated with decreased cost of equity capital for two reasons. First, investors are
less subject to implied transaction cost (Botosan 2000; Leuz and Wysocki 2008).
Second, as investors may buy or sell on liquid markets with less risk of future order
imbalances, they take larger current positions (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991;
Baiman and Verrecchia 1996). In both cases, stock prices increase with higher
market liquidity, thus implying a decreased cost of equity capital.
Based on these deliberations, we formulate hypothesis H1, which reflects the
main thrust of our analysis, as follows:
H1: There is a negative association between a firm’s strategy disclosure level in
the management report and the cost of equity capital.
In addition to analyzing the direct association between the levels of voluntary
strategy disclosure in the management report and the cost of equity capital, we also
study its relationship with firms’ bid–ask spreads and trading volume of shares (e.g.,
Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Gru¨ning 2011). Both
variables tend to react to increased levels of voluntary strategy disclosures
(Wagenhofer and Ewert 2007: 408).
First, the above-mentioned literature suggests that lower information asymmetry
between investors is associated with decreased bid–ask spreads. This notion is
supported, for instance, by a model developed by Kim and Verrecchia (1994), in
which uninformed market makers increase bid–ask spreads to compensate for losses
resulting from trading with more informed investors. Empirical support for this
notion is provided by Glosten and Harris (1988), Welker (1995), Coller and Yohn
(1997), Healy et al. (1999) or Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). Second, it follows from
the literature that less information asymmetry induced by increased disclosure is
also associated with increased trading volumes (Frankel et al. 1999; Healy et al.
1999; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Gru¨ning 2011).
Given that the literature indicates that both bid–ask spreads and trading volumes
are related to the level of information provided to investors, we therefore assume
that if investors use voluntary strategy disclosures for decision-making, disclosure
levels should also be associated with bid–ask spreads and trading volumes. Our
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second hypothesis H2 may be interpreted as a robustness check, following the
advice on method triangulation of Denzin (1978) and Downward and Mearman
(2007):
H2: There is a negative (positive) association between a firm’s strategy disclosure
level in the management report and bid–ask spreads for the firm’s shares
(trading volume of shares).
4 Sample selection and characteristics
Our study focuses on companies publicly listed on German capital market in one of
four main indices of the stock exchange provider Deutsche Bo¨rse AG. These
indices, Dax, MDax, TecDax, SDax, comprise 160 firms. From the firms listed in
these indices at the end of June 2009, a sample of 100 companies was selected. First,
to limit the analysis to firms in non-financial industries, 26 from the so-called super-
sector FIRE (banks, insurance and real estate companies) were excluded. Another
29 firms were dropped because they were not listed throughout the entire
investigation period 2002 to 2008. Finally, five firms had to be excluded, as they
were not registered under German law and chose not to publish a management
report according to German GAAP. The selection procedure yielded a sample of
100 firms listed on the German Stock Exchange end of June 2009 (Table 1).
We set the analysis period from 2002 to 2008, in order to capture a multi-year
perspective for the investigation of voluntary strategy disclosures. We did not
expand the analysis period beyond 2008 because management reports for the period
2009 to 2010 are neither appropriate for analysis nor comparable to management
reports for the years from 2002 to 2008 due to the global economic and financial
crisis. Our cross-sectional design thus resulted in 700 firm-year observations. We
collected all management reports either by downloading official versions from
corporate websites or by requesting hard copies from investor relations managers.
Having restricted our sample to index-listed firms, our analysis is not representative
of all listed firms or even more so of all firms publishing a management report as it is
Table 1 Sample selection procedure
Sampling procedure steps Absolute number Percent




SDax ?50 160 100
Firms in financial, insurance, and real estate industries –26 -16
Other firms excluded from sample
Not listed during 2002 to 2008 –29
Registered under non-German law –5 –34 -21
Number of sample firms 100 63
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not randomly drawn from these populations. However, the analyzed firms cover about
66 % of the market value of all listed firms at this time which was approximately 797
bn € at the end of 2008. Table 2 shows the heterogeneity of our sample with respect to
market value (MV), total revenues (REV), number of employees (EMPL) and book
value of total assets (ASSETS).
We also use these parameters to ensure the representativeness of our sample by
comparing the 100 firms selected with the population of all firms listed in the four
indices (N = 160). Additionally, we verified that the qualitative structure of our
sample represents the structure of all 160 firms, to ensure that the omission of 34
firms not belonging to the super-sector FIRE does not distort our final sample (refer
to ‘‘Appendix 3’’ for details).
5 Research model and variable measurement
5.1 Empirical model
We expect strategy-relevant disclosures to diffuse gradually and subtly over time rather
than as an ‘event’ that can be scheduled precisely. We therefore opt for cross-sectional
regression analysis, following the major body of literature represented, amongst others,
by Botosan (1997), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Hail (2002), Daske (2006), Glaum
et al. (2011), or Dhaliwal et al. (2011). ‘‘Appendix 2’’ provides a detailed overview of
all variables surveyed with respect to our sample and lists the relevant data sources. A
careful inspection of data included in our model did not reveal any immediate need to
eliminate outliers. However, variables with skewed distributions were transformed into
logarithmic data, in order to make our data set more robust.
To test our hypotheses, we use linear OLS regression analysis, that is, regressing
the cost of equity capital (CC) as well as bid–ask spreads (BAS) and trading
volumes (TV) on voluntary strategy disclosure scores (SDS) and several controls
identified from prior literature. Thus, the generic specification of our three models is
as follows:
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of research sample
Mean Extremes Percentile SD n
Min Max 25 % 50 % 75 %
Descriptive statistics of sample firms
MV 6.13 0.01 100.1 0.32 0.94 4.32 13.33 700
REV 10.47 0.00 151.61 0.50 1.63 7.51 21.98 700
EMPL 41.62 0.02 536.33 2.40 8.04 36.83 85.88 700
ASSETS 14.13 0.00 262.22 0.38 1.38 7.85 35.45 700
MV is the market value of firm’s equity at the end of each calendar year. REV is total revenue, EMPL is
the number of employees reported for each fiscal year and ASSETS is the book value of totals assets at
the end of each fiscal year
All numbers are stated in EUR bn., except for EMPL (‘000). For a detailed explanation of variables and
data sources, see Appendix 2
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CC ðBAS; TVÞ ¼ aþ bSDS  SDS þ
Xn
i¼1
bi  Controli þ e: ð1Þ
Our empirical model implies that within data analysis, we have to ensure formal
compliance with key prerequisites of linear regressions. We also need to address
major critical issues regarding our research design, such as potential endogeneity of
the key variable SDS. We also show that the SDS have an incremental effect beyond
overall disclosure quantity in the financial reporting package. Results of these
further analyses are discussed in Sect. 7.
5.2 Independent variable: strategy disclosure scores
Literature provides several empirical approaches to measuring disclosure level.
Some papers use available archival metrics on disclosure rankings, e.g., AIMR data
(e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Healy et al. 1999; Lang and Lundholm 2000 or
Botosan and Plumlee 2002). Others use self-constructed scores that are based on a
normative understanding of ‘comprehensive’ disclosures (e.g., Hossain et al. 1995;
Gray et al. 1995; Botosan 1997; Hail 2002; Jones 2007; Gru¨ning 2011).
As there is no appropriate archival data for the strategy disclosure levels of
German firms we had to follow the second research avenue by developing and
validating self-constructed strategy disclosure scores (SDS), as a thorough
composite index for measuring voluntary strategy disclosure scores. In a nutshell,
the SDS are derived by applying a scorecard on comprehensive strategy reporting to
management reports of our sample firms thus following a well-established hand-
collecting procedure in the disclosure quality literature (e.g., Botosan 1997; Hail
2002). This allows for an in-depth analysis of the quantitative, as well as the
qualitative level of strategy reporting, by using elaborate metric of firm individual
levels of strategy disclosures. Any value SDSi,t represents the individual amount of
voluntary strategy information disclosed by a firm i in its annual management report
covering period t.
Healy and Palepu (2001) draw attention to increased noise especially in self-
constructed measures, so that careful validation of the SDS is necessary. An
additional, more recently discussed issue in this context is whether a given measure
of disclosure level assessing disclosure quantity also captures disclosure quality.
Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) show that measures of disclosure quantity inade-
quately reflect disclosure quality and therefore postulate the need for multi-
dimensional measurement frameworks for this purpose. We heed both concerns by
using an elaborate framework for strategy reporting based on the seminal literature
in this field, and explicitly testing the reliability as well as the validity of the
measured scores.
To develop the scorecard underlying the measurement of SDS, we use a
normative catalogue of disclosure items based on prior research on voluntary
disclosure practice, as well as on recommendations to use value reporting disclosure
scorecards (e.g., Meek et al. 1995). We thus build a catalogue of reporting items
reflecting a broad and comprehensive set of strategic aspects enabling addressees of
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management reports to obtain an exhaustive and consistent picture of firm strategy
(Beretta and Bozzolan 2008).
Overall, the SDS reflect the three generic phases of a strategy process, i.e.,
strategic analysis, strategy definition or formulation as well as the implementation
of strategic programs (Grant 1991; Collis and Montgomery 1997; Rowe et al. 1994;
Thompson and Strickland 2003; Robbins and Coulter 2007). In addition, the SDS
identify information provided on overall corporate level of strategy, i.e., portfolio
strategy, from strategy disclosures at the business level. As a result, we group a total
of 40 reporting items into five categories of strategic information (I–V, Table 3),
creating a multi-dimensional framework, with a total of 12 sub-categories covering
the breadth of strategy disclosure. Up to five items in each sub-category capture its
depth by successively detailing reporting requirements. Whilst Table 3 shows a
condensed version of our measurement, ‘‘Appendix 4’’ provides information on the
40 items, as well as on the specific strategic content per item in detail.
The measurement of the SDS reflects the relative importance of generic phases of
strategy processes through the relative number of reporting items per phase. As the
results of strategic analysis are critical for sophisticated and thorough strategic
management, 50 % of 40 items (or 20 items, respectively) deal with strategy
Table 3 Scorecard for strategy disclosure scores






I 1 Political/social/legal environment 2 6 (15 % of 40 items)
2 Macro-economic environment 2
3 Strategic position of corporation 2
Business environment
II 1 Market environment 5 14 (35 %)
2 Competitive environment 5
3 Strategic position of business 4
Strategy definition and detailing
Corporate strategy
III 1 Overall strategic orientation 2 5 (12.5 %)
2 Strategic objectives of corporation 3
Business strategy
IV 1 Strategic objectives of business 3 10 (25 %)
2 Details on business strategy 7
Strategy implementation
V 1 Communication to, motivation of staff 2 5 (12.5 %)
2 Realization of strategy 3
Sum 40 (100 %)
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disclosures in this respect. Another 50 % or 20 items cover the strategy definition
and strategy implementation phases. All 40 items are weighted equally as proposed
by Spero (1979) or Meek et al. (1995), which is also in line with most of the
empirical disclosure literature (for details as well as a robustness check on using
equal weights in SDS assessment, see ‘‘Appendix 5’’).
To measure SDS, we conduct content analyses of 700 management reports
published by German listed entities during 2002 and 2008 and score one single point
for each of the items identified (as in Meek et al. 1995; Botosan 1997; Jones 2007).
Content analyses of the 700 annual reports resulting from our sample were
conducted by hand-collection. More specifically, a single coder performed the
content analyses within approximately 3 months, by analyzing all 700 management
reports in randomized order to minimize subjectivity bias (Healy and Palepu 2001),
completing specific questionnaires covering our research measure (SDS). Individual
firm scores are calculated by dividing the number of items disclosed (i.e., points
awarded) by the maximum of 40 items. Thus, the standardized disclosure scores
range between zero and one. The measurement results for all 700 firm-years are
provided in ‘‘Appendix 6’’.
As large firms could achieve higher scores because of greater disclosure
opportunities due to the complexity of their organizational structures and the
number of businesses they manage, we took several steps to circumvent this
problem. First, we reduced the total number of items in the scorecard (maximum
number of points awarded) to 35 instead of 40, if a firm was active in only one
single business segment. Second, multi-segment firms were only awarded a point for
a specific item if the respective disclosure was provided for all relevant businesses
managed. Third, we limited SDS to those reporting items which all firms are able to
disclose independent of firm size. Finally, we did not award multiple points for
multiple references to the same item.
Descriptive statistics on SDS are given in Table 4 and reveal an overall average
disclosure level of 34 %, ranging from 3 % (minimum) to 83 % (maximum).
Regarding SDS sub-scores, we find that on average, firms emphasize disclosures
regarding strategic analysis, rather than on defined strategies and even less so on
strategy implementation (the measurement database of SDS is provided in
‘‘Appendix 6’’).
To examine the measurement reliability of the SDS, we first test for internal
consistency. As one can assume that firms coordinate their reporting strategy across
various reporting avenues (Lang and Lundholm 1993), each component in the SDS
should proxy for all other components. Thus, all components of our disclosure index
should exhibit a positive correlation with one another (Table 5). Even though each
coefficient is positive and highly significant, correlation between the SDS
components is considerably lower than the correlation between the SDS compo-
nents and the overall disclosure scores. We therefore conclude that the SDS
components capture different aspects of disclosure, but are still well proxied by the
overall SDS.
As a further test of internal consistency, following Lapointe-Antunes et al.
(2006), we calculate a global Cronbach’s Alpha (Cronbach 1951) for the pooled
sample of 700 observations as well as annual Alphas for each of the 7 years from
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2002 to 2008. Cronbach’s Alpha is a coefficient which takes on a maximum value of
one when the correlation between each pair of components in the SDS is perfect.
The global Alpha for the components of the SDS is 0.713; annual Alphas range
between 0.600 and 0.757 (not tabulated). Even though there is no standard test of
significance for Cronbach’s Alpha statistics, prior research accepts indices with an
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of strategy disclosure scores
Score Mean Extremes Percentiles SD
Min Max 25 % 50 % 75 %
SDS total 0.34 0.03 0.83 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.12
SDS sub-scores
Analysis 0.38 0.06 0.85 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.13
Strategy 0.36 0.00 0.87 0.20 0.33 0.47 0.18
Implementation 0.09 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.15
SDS total is the overall strategy disclosure score representing disclosure on strategic aspects. SDS sub-
score ‘Analysis’ is the partial company disclosure score for disclosure on information gathered through
strategic analysis both on corporate and business level. SDS sub-score ‘Strategy’ is the partial company
disclosure score for disclosure on defined strategy and its detailing. SDS sub-score ‘Implementation’ is
the partial company disclosure score for disclosure on information about the realization of strategic
programs as well as the integration in firm-wide communication and incentive systems
All numbers are standardized with a minimum value of zero and a maximum of one (sub-scores stan-
dardized based on maximum items included per category). A score of e.g., 0.4 signals a reflection of 40 %
of our items. All data are based on n = 700 observations
Table 5 Reliability of strategy disclosure scores
Correlation analysis of strategy disclosure scores and related sub-scores
1 2 3 4
1 SDS total 0.824*** (0.000) 0.851*** (0.000) 0.480*** (0.000)
2 SDS sub-score
‘analysis’
0.857*** (0.000) 0.458*** (0.000) 0.306*** (0.000)
3 SDS sub-score
‘strategy’
0.852*** (0.000) 0.493*** (0.000) 0.339*** (0.000)
4 SDS sub-score
‘implementation’
0.552*** (0.000) 0.378*** (0.000) 0.361*** (0.000)
SDS total is the overall company disclosure score, representing disclosure on strategic aspects. The SDS
sub-score ‘analysis’ is the partial company disclosure score on information gathered through strategic
analysis, both at the corporate and business levels. The SDS sub-score ‘strategy’ is the partial company
disclosure score for defined strategy and its detailing. The SDS sub-score ‘implementation’ is the partial
company disclosure score for information about the realization of strategic programs, as well as inte-
gration within firm-wide communication and incentive systems. All data are based on n = 700
observations
The numbers below the diagonal represent Pearson’s correlation coefficients and those above the diag-
onal, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients
The p values (F values) noted (in parentheses) are for a two-tail test of statistical significance; * (**; ***)
indicate statistical significance at the p \ 0.10 (0.05; 0.01) level
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Alpha of less than 0.700 (e.g., Botosan 1997). We therefore assume that the SDS are
a reliable measure of strategy disclosure.
To capture measurement validity of the SDS, we draw on previous literature
(e.g., Ahmed 1995) that finds strong associations between overall disclosure scores
and firm characteristics. We therefore analyze the relationships between the
disclosure scores with typical determinants of disclosure policy. These are the
market value of equity (MV), foreign listing status (LIST), financial leverage
(LEV), or whether a firm is audited by a Big-Four company (BIG4). The results in
Table 6 thus confirm the validity of SDS by showing significantly high and positive
coefficients, using correlation analysis as a robustness check.
As a final robustness check, we also validated the SDS by correlating them with
alternative disclosure scores derived from the German competition ‘Best Annual
Report’ (Baetge 1992), which also relate to strategy information, but much more
approximately (for details refer to ‘‘Appendix 7’’). These results also support our
notion that the SDS are highly suitable for measuring the level of voluntary strategy
disclosure.
5.3 Dependent variables: cost of equity capital, bid–ask spreads and trading
volumes
To measure the effect of voluntary strategy disclosures, we use implied cost of
equity capital, as well as bid–ask spreads and trading volume as additional
measures. If voluntary strategy disclosure indeed affects investor decision-making
regarding the risk-component of cost of equity capital (H1), it should also be
associated with trading volumes and bid–ask spreads which are also susceptible to
increased disclosure levels (H2).
With respect to the measurement of the cost of equity capital, we adhere to
suggestions made by Gebhardt et al. (2001), as well as Hail (2002), to compute the
ex-ante cost rate via the ‘residual income model’, in which firm value is represented
as a function of forecasted accounting data subject only to the ‘clean surplus
relation’. In this model, firm value equals reported book value plus an infinite sum
of discounted residual income and is expressed as a function of accounting numbers,
namely future earnings and expected book values. The so-called implied cost of
Table 6 Validity of strategy disclosure scores
MV LIST LEV BIG4
Correlation analysis of strategy disclosure scores and firm characteristics
SDS (n = 700) 0.487*** (0.000) 0.225*** (0.000) 0.139*** (0.001) 0.187*** (0.000)
MV is the natural logarithm of a firm’s market value of equity. LIST a categorical variable taking a value
of one if a firm is cross-listed on the NYSE. LEV is a factor representing a firm’s leverage. BIG4 is a
categorical variable taking a value of one if a firm is audited by a Big-Four auditor. YEAR controls for
potential time-dependent influences. The numbers shown are Spearman correlation coefficients. For more
details, see Appendix 2
The p values (F values) noted (in parentheses) are for a two-tail test of statistical significance; * (**; ***)
indicate statistical significance at the p \ 0.10 (0.05; 0.01) level
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equity capital rate is then computed as the internal rate of return that equates a firm’s
intrinsic value to the current stock price.
In spite of the limitations inherent to accounting-based approximations of cost of
equity capital, Daske et al. (2010) support this measurement design, arguing that such
approximations for cost of equity capital are robust and even more reliable than models
based on abnormal earnings growth. However, in practical valuation analysis
accounting data should only be forecasted over finite horizons. Therefore, following
Hail (2002), we set the forecast horizon of our residual income model to 12 periods and
adopt a three-stage approach to calculating firm value. First, we use earnings forecasts
of analysts for the next 3 years. Second, we compute future earnings by linearly fading
down year t ? 3 return on book value of equity to a mean average market return by
t ? T. Finally, terminal value is derived by perpetuating t = 12 income:
Pt ¼ BVt þ
Xn
s¼1
ðXtþs  re  BVtþs1Þ




ðXtþs  re  BVtþs1Þ
ð1 þ reÞs þ
ðXtþTþ1  re  BVtþTÞ
re  ð1 þ reÞT
ð2Þ
where
Pt Average stock price of a firm’s shares at t
Xt?s Future accounting earnings expected in period (t ? s - 1, t ? s); either
forecasted explicitly or generated by a linear fading rate or constant as
terminal income
re Estimate of ex-ante cost of equity capital as internal rate of return
BVt?s Future accounting book value of equity at t ? s, based on the clean surplus
relation with future dividends, estimated using a constant (historic) pay-out
ratio
Following Eq. (2), estimates of future book values and future dividends are
required in order to calculate future residual income. To compute future book
values, we also need to make some assumptions about dividend pay-out. Due to a
lack of more accurate data, we assume net dividends to constitute a constant ratio of
expected earnings over the forecast horizon, with dividend pay-out ratio derived as a
historical mean adjusted for unusual observations. The terminal value is computed
on the assumption that the net dividend equals t ? s earnings. Thus, we expect no
further growth in later periods (e.g., Hail 2002). We calculate the target accounting
return on equity of 8 %, based on the long-term historic average rate of return of the
German stock market over 30 years (Table 7).
In addition, on the left side of the residual income model, we also need stock price
data, as it is set equal to the intrinsic value. We use average price per year to minimize
potential bias which could be induced by focusing on a single day or month. This
procedure also accounts for the sequential release of reports and heterogeneous horizons
of processing management reports by investors and the subsequent reflection in market
values. Stock price and book value data were provided by Datastream, other data were
collected from I/B/E/S (for details, see ‘‘Appendix 2’’).
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In order to validate our cost of equity capital estimates, we set up a test model for
CC based on the literature (e.g., Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Hail
2002; Hail and Leuz 2006). Following the economic theory, a valid measure of cost
of equity capital should increase with risk, as reflected in market beta (BETA) and
leverage (LEV) and should decrease with rising market value of equity (MV). We
therefore perform a simple correlation analysis and an OLS regression with these
parameters in Table 8 in order to test the validity of CC. The results support our
assumption that the residual income model provides valid estimates for firm
individual cost of equity capital.
Beyond CC, we complement our investigation by analyzing two other metrics,
i.e., bid–ask spreads (BAS) and trading volume (TV) in firm shares. All raw data
were provided by Datastream. We compute BAS as relative spreads, that is,
absolute spreads scaled by bid price on the basis of daily closing data at the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). With around 255 trading days annually for each of
the 7 years in question, we calculate the annual mean relative bid–ask spreads. For
robustness checks however, we also keep absolute spreads.
To operationalize trading volume TV, we cumulate daily monetary trading
volume at the most liquid German stock exchanges, the FSE and the Xetra, for each
trading day. To reduce skewness, we use the natural logarithm and additionally
calculate stock turnover data, i.e., daily trading volume divided by the respective
market capitalization. Table 8 provides descriptive statistics on all independent
variables.
5.4 Control variables
To capture firm heterogeneity, as well as other variables that are likely to determine
reporting decisions, we use a broad set of metric control variables for firm
characteristics and capital market data.
Table 8 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables
Parameter Period Mean Extremes Percentile SD n
Min Max 25 % 50 % 75 %
Panel A: descriptive statistics of cost of equity capital estimates
CC—cost of
equity capital
(t ? 1) 6.782 1.270 13.52 5.685 6.610 7.790 1.868 661
Panel B: descriptive statistics of proxies of cost of equity capital
BAS—bid–
ask spread
(t ? 1) 0.0106 0.0009 0.0794 0.0045 0.0085 0.0139 0.0085 700
TV—trading
volume [Ln]
(t ? 1) 20.64 13.30 26.40 18.90 20.20 22.40 2.381 700
Symbol (t ? 1) indicates the availability of data: data marked with (t) collected for 2002 to 2008, data
marked with (t ? 1) for 2003 until the end of 2009 (maximum 700 observations). However, some data
marked (t ? 1) are only partly available for the entire time period, with less than 700 observations. For
more details, see Appendix 2
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In order to test H1, we follow the generic specification of our research model and
include a broad set of control variables. First, we control for a firm’s market value of
equity (MV) to account for the richness of its information environment. Market
value (MV) is computed as the natural logarithm of market value of total equity at
the end of each calendar year.
Furthermore, we use market beta (BETA) and firm leverage (LEV) to control for
a firm’s systematic or financial risk (Botosan 1997; Gietzmann and Ireland 2005).
Leverage (LEV) is a control variable extracted as a factor by means of principal
component analysis, using four ratios reflecting a firm’s debt, i.e., overall debt, long-
term debt, net debt, and debt over equity. Another metric control variable included
is the annual share price volatility (VOLA), which is the average annual price
movement to a high and low from a mean for each year.
We control for firm profitability by using PROF, which is extracted as a factor via
principal component analysis, from the three core margin figures EBITDA, EBIT
and net income margin, thus capturing their common variance. As an additional
control, we also include the annual share price return (RET). We control for market
liquidity using the annual share trading volume (TV) and the inverse free float (IFF),
which is the ratio of firm’s share capital not actively traded or held by major
stakeholders.
With respect to H1, in accordance with the literature we expect the coefficients of
MV, PROF, TV and IFF to have negative signs and the coefficients of BETA, LEV,
VOLA and RET to have positive signs.
In addition, we include non-metric controls that might influence the cost of equity
capital. For example, the index in which a firm is listed might influence investors’
risk perceptions. We therefore employ index dummies capturing the respective
share index in which firms are included, i.e., Dax, MDax, TecDax or SDax, using
‘no index’ as a reference category. Another qualitative control consists of several
industry dummies following the sector logic of Deutsche Bo¨rse AG, with the sector
‘‘Telecommunications’’ as a reference category. Furthermore, we use dummies
representing the industry in which a firm operates and three other categorical
variables, one of which is firm age to proxy for corporate culture (e.g., Gibbins et al.
1990). More precisely, we employ age dummies as a qualitative control representing
the first three quartiles of sample firms ranked by age, with the fourth quartile
chosen as the reference category. Other dummy variables capture the nature of
firms’ accounting practices, namely the standard followed (German-GAAP vs. IFRS
or US-GAAP) and the impact of Big-Four audits.
To test H2, we also use several additional control variables, for which previous
research finds associations with both bid–ask spreads and trading volumes. For
example, bid–ask spreads (BAS) are assumed to be negatively associated with
trading volumes (TV), the annual average mean number of analysts following a firm
(NAF) or the annual share price return (RET). On the other hand, bid–ask spreads
are supposed to be positively related to annual share price volatility (VOLA) and
also to the inverse free float (IFF), as small free floats indicate that shareholders with
large closely held stakes might have superior access to corporate information
(Glosten and Harris 1988; Welker 1995; Healy et al. 1999). In addition, we include
firm’s market value of equity (MV) to capture firm size and four index dummies,
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assuming bid–ask spreads to be negatively associated with both firm size and listing
status (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). We also use YEAR as a dummy variable to
control for potential time-dependent influence.
In testing for H2, we also regress trading volumes (TV) on several controls
besides SDS. For example, prior studies have identified significant associations with
market value and volatility, as well as listing status and ownership structure
(Bessembinder et al. 1996). We therefore include the market value of equity (MV),
annual share price volatility (VOLA) and four index dummies in our model, for
which we predict positive coefficients. Further, we include the inverse free float
(IFF), predicting a negative coefficient, as TV may decrease with a higher number
of closely held shares. We put additional controls into the final model, in order to
substantiate our analysis, namely market beta (BETA), annual share price return
(RET) and firm profitability (PROF), for which we assume positive coefficients. In
addition, we apply listing status and year as non-metric controls via dummy
variables. Finally, we also control for potential time-dependent influence by using
YEAR as a dummy variable.
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics on metric control variables. ‘‘Appendix 2’’
contains an explanation of the variables and data sources.
6 Results
6.1 Bivariate analysis
In this section, we examine the association between strategy disclosure scores (SDS)
and the cost of equity capital (CC), bid–ask spreads (BAS) and trading volume
(TV). As hypothesized above, we expect our key variable SDS to be negatively
associated with CC and BAS and positively associated with TV. To reduce (limited)
skewness of distributions, we use the natural logarithm of CC, TV and BAS for our
analysis.
As Table 10 exhibits, all relevant correlation coefficients have the expected sign
and are highly significant at a level\1 %. Specifically, the correlation between CC
and SDS is rPearson = -0.198 as well as rSpearman = -0.216, being significant at a
1 % level.
6.2 Multivariate analysis
6.2.1 H1: association of voluntary strategy disclosure with cost of equity capital
In order to test H1, we conform to the generic specification of our research model
and include a broad set of control variables.
The results obtained from estimating regressions using OLS are provided in
Table 11, which presents the model in four different specifications, to account for a
stepwise broadening of our perspective on the cost of capital effects of strategy
disclosure. Referring to our final model, we achieve an adjusted R2 of 37 %. The
standardized coefficients of our metric controls MV, LEV, PROF, TV, RET, and
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IFF all behave as predicted and are significant at the 10 % level or better. The only
exception is VOLA, which shows a contradictory, albeit weak, coefficient in the
basic model. Thus, we can show that CC decreases with a higher MV, higher levels
of PROF, and higher TV. CC also increases with a higher firm beta, higher firm
leverage and higher share price return, which is reasonable as the share price
represents the left side of the equation, and the more the share price increases, the
higher IRR needs to become in order to solve the equation.
Our analysis supports H1, i.e., increasing levels of voluntary strategy disclosure
(SDS) are negatively associated with cost of equity capital (CC) even after
controlling for variation in a broad set of other variables. The magnitude of this
effect ranges from bSDS = -0.112 in the basic model to bSDS = -0.135 in the final
model, thus indicating that firms with most forthcoming strategy disclosure behavior
may benefit from a reduction in cost of equity capital compared to less talkative
firms.
In addition, some non-metric controls in Table 11 yield significant coefficients
and thus indicate that such factors may influence cost of equity capital. For example,
our results indicate that the accounting practices of firms seem to have a systematic
influence. Moreover, older firms seemingly derive cost of equity capital benefits
compared to younger firms, as investors are likely to perceive fewer risks when a
firm has proven its stability over a period of several years. Index dummies on the
other hand mostly fail to show a significant influence on cost of equity capital.
Comparing the standardized regression coefficients of SDS to the metric and non-
metric controls, we find that several controls have larger coefficients and therefore
indicate a stronger economic impact. Still, this does not impair our analysis, as our
results relate to strategy disclosure as one of several factors influencing the cost of
equity capital. In other words, under a given strategy, it is better to provide more
than less information with respect to cost of equity capital.
6.2.2 H2: association of voluntary strategy disclosures with bid–ask spreads
and trading volume
To test H2, we regress bid–ask spreads (BAS), as well as trading volumes (TV),
together with several control variables on disclosure scores (SDS). Our final analysis is
shown in Table 12. For both panels A and B, we find significant regression coefficients
for the association of voluntary strategy disclosure with signs as predicted, i.e., SDS
being negatively associated with BAS and positively associated with TV. We
therefore cannot refute H2. Together with our results for H1, this supports our theory
that voluntary strategy disclosure is indeed associated with investor decision-making.
Firms with high levels of voluntary strategy disclosure benefit from a lower cost of
equity capital, their bid–ask spreads are smaller and their trading volumes are higher
than those of firms with low disclosure levels.
Furthermore, panel A of Table 12 indicates that SDS, together with other control
variables, explain up to 78 % of the variation in BAS, which is similar to results
obtained in comparable studies (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). This supports the
theoretical notion that higher levels of strategy disclosure generally signal a richer
information environment of a given firm or less information asymmetry, making
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shares more attractive to outside investors. However, the magnitude of bSDS which
indicates the impact of increased strategy disclosure is relatively low, so one should
not necessarily regard SDS as the only workable lever for narrowing bid–ask
spreads.
Furthermore, referring to the final model in panel A, several of our control
variables (MV, IFF as well as the index dummies) are significant and show the
predicted signs, which indicates that characteristics of a firm’s information
environment are relevant for the width of bid–ask spreads. Especially all firm
size-related controls (MV, index dummies) reveal the expected dominant influence
on bid–ask spreads. To conclude, even in such a strictly controlled model, SDS is
still able to show a significant association with BAS.
Contrary to our prediction that an increasing number of analysts following a firm
reduces information asymmetry and therefore BAS, the number of analysts following
a firm (NAF) shows a positive and significant coefficient. In related studies, using the
number of analysts used as a control variable has also resulted in counter-intuitive
regression coefficients. Richardson and Welker (2001), for example, fail to identify
the hypothesized cost of capital effect of this variable. We thus argue that a large
number of analysts even increase information asymmetries, as they typically release
diverging estimates, producing a somewhat mixed picture on the future of a firm, thus
suggesting that not all analysts have the same level of information. However, this issue
calls for additional and deeper research.
Panel B of Table 12 shows that our final model for TV is also highly significant
and explains more than 80 % of the variation in TV. The standardized regression
coefficient for SDS is significant and has a positive sign as predicted. In line with
our results regarding BAS, the magnitude of bSDS is considerably lower with
bSDS = 0.077, but significant at virtually all levels of statistical significance, even in
a fairly controlled setting of our final model. In addition, most of the controls
achieve high levels of significance, with market value (MV) and listing status
yielding the highest coefficients. Thus, the firm size-related controls again confirm
their undisputable importance for disclosure research. All of our controls in the final
model have the predicted signs, except for RET and PROF, for which we would
have expected positive rather than negative coefficients. Nonetheless, it is not
uncommon in the disclosure literature to have unexpected signs and/or insignificant
results for the control variables, especially in settings with many control variables
(see, e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Gu and Li 2007, or the overview in
Wagenhofer and Ewert 2007: 402–403). Especially in our case, we assume
extraordinary share price returns and above-average profit margins of smaller firms
that have lower trading volumes, compared to blue-chip companies as potential
causes for these unexpected signs.
7 Further analyses and robustness checks
In order to exclude possible sources of error regarding the impact of voluntary
strategy disclosure, we perform further analyses and robustness checks (see
Table 13) beyond ensuring the formal compliance of our models with the
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prerequisites of OLS regressions, i.e., absence of multicollinearity, heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. Applying the relevant test procedures does not indicate
any violation of these premises.
As a first robustness check, we analyze the incremental effect of strategy
disclosure beyond sheer disclosure quantity, proxied either by the page count of
management reports or by a disclosure metric comprising all non-strategic
disclosures. In a second analysis, we depart from the hypothesized linear
relationship in our model. In a third model, we also explicitly consider the de
facto panel structure of our data. Fourthly and finally, we investigate any potential
endogeneity of our key variable SDS.
(1) Incremental effect of SDS: From our perspective, a major issue is that of
assessing the incremental effect of SDS on the cost of equity capital, bid–ask
spreads and trading volume. More precisely, we have to rule out our results
being simply driven by overall disclosure quantity and/or quality within the
other parts of the financial reporting package, which might be correlated with
SDS, as firms have been shown to coordinate their reporting avenues (Lang
and Lundholm 1993).
We address this issue by first introducing the variable MR Page as a control
variable. MR Page represents the total number of pages of management
reports, thus indicating a purely quantitative dimension of reporting as a
robustness check (Table 13, panel B/model 1a). Second, we proxy overall
disclosure quality in the annual report by using the database of the German
competition ‘Best Annual Report’ (Baetge 1992). More specifically, we
compile BAR Net as a control variable measuring overall disclosure in the
annual report, but excluding all items related to strategy disclosures in the
management report (for more details, see ‘‘Appendix 7’’). BAR Net thus
comprises approximately 270 of 300 items surveyed in the ‘Best Annual
Report’ database, representing both broadness, as well as the quality of
information provided in a firm’s financial reporting package, apart from
strategy disclosures (Table 13, panel B/model 1b). The results of both models
(1a) and (1b) indicate that even in settings where SDS is regressed jointly with
either BAR Net or MR Page to isolate the incremental effect of SDS, the
association of strategy disclosure with cost of equity capital (CC), bid–ask
spreads (BAS) and trading volumes (TV) holds true. In the case of CC and
BAS, it even becomes more pronounced.
However, it is noticeable that both control variables BAR Net and MR
Page show unexpected positive signs. Several specific factors may be
responsible for these results. The literature generally criticizes MR Page as
a measure that does not adequately capture disclosure quality (Beretta and
Bozzolan 2008). With respect to BAR Net, the measurement method
underlying this score is not stable over time, as items are changed, added or
eliminated. Additionally, the BAR Net items not only cover information
content in the annual report, but also the way information is presented, e.g.,
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with graphical and other layout techniques. Therefore, both control
variables are invariably noisy, which may then result in unexpected signs
and/or insignificant results with respect to bid–ask spreads and trading
volumes.
(2) Functional relationship: Panel B (model 2) of Table 13 also provides results
of a robustness check regarding the hypothesized linear functional relationship
between independent and dependent variables, to ensure that we have not mis-
specified our models. As we generally assume linear relations as reflected in
panel A, our findings differ from several prior studies which argue that
disclosure indices merely produce scores on an ordinal scale and therefore
favor rank regressions (Iman and Conover 1979) in order to circumvent the
assumption of linear relationships (Lang and Lundholm 1996). However, as
explanatory power would inevitably decline when computing ranks for all
variables, we conduct rank regressions only as robustness checks (Cooke
1998).
We find that rank regressions support our initial findings, as ranks of SDS
consistently turn out to have significant coefficients, retaining the predicted
signs after inverting all data in order to make the results comparable.
Additionally, the rank regressions achieve determination coefficients similar to
original models.
(3) Panel structure of data: Beyond stressing the hypothesized linear relationships,
we need to explicitly consider the panel structure in our data set resulting from
pooling seven data points from 2002 to 2008 for each of the 100 firms into a
cross-sectional design. Thus, our results may be subject to dependence of
observations in the two dimensions of time and firm heterogeneity. While
controlling for time is obviously necessary in a multi-year setting, we
consistently control for firm heterogeneity by using individual firm-control
variables such as profitability, leverage or firm size, with the latter having
proved to be the most relevant (Wagenhofer and Ewert 2007: 399–403).
To capture potential panel effects, we run our models as fixed effects models,
additionally using the within transformation of all variables. We assume that
firm heterogeneity is constant over time and correlated with the independent
variables, so that a fixed effects model is appropriate. The results are presented
in Table 13, panel B (model 3) demonstrate that non-observable firm-fixed
effects do not influence our original results. Additionally, we run general linear
(GLM) regressions while clustering the firms in our sample into 100 clusters,
with each cluster containing seven firm-years and again controlling for time
effects (Table 13, panel B/model 4). With this procedure, we explicitly refrain
from our initial cross-sectional design, but find that the results generally hold
true, with the exception that SDS fails to be indisputably significant in the BAS
model.
(4) Potential endogeneity: As firms may choose their reporting strategy on the
basis of given costs and benefits of enhanced reporting, our analysis could also
suffer from endogeneity due to self-selection bias (Heckman 1978) which
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would yield spurious coefficients (e.g., Fields et al. 2001; Nikolaev and van
Lent 2005; van Lent 2007). Although some studies recommend estimating
two-equation models using 2SLS, this approach often fails to deliver
convincing results (Larcker and Rusticus 2007; or Baetge et al. 2010).
We therefore take some preventive action to avoid endogeneity. Besides using
controls that are likely to determine firms’ reporting decisions, we made a
temporal distinction between the exogenous voluntary strategy disclosure
(SDS) in period t and the endogenous capital market reactions CC, BAS and
TV in period t ? 1. Additionally, we apply a version of the Hausman (1978)
test to ensure that SDS is an exogenous parameter of our regression models.
For each model, we run a regression of SDS on all remaining parameters and
include residuals of these routines as an additional variable in the models. If
residuals yield coefficients significantly different from zero, then endogeneity
would be an issue. However, the results in Table 13 (panel B/model 5) reveal
the residual terms not being significant. Thus, we conclude that SDS should be
interpreted as exogenous. Additional 2SLS regressions compiled after having
regressed SDS on a broad set of variables potentially determining disclosure
behavior (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) confirm the outcome of the Hausman
test.
Based on these additional analyses and tests, presented comprehensively in
Table 13, we are confident that the results of our models are robust and constitute a
solid platform for discussing our findings and drawing key implications in the final
section of our paper.
8 Discussion and conclusion
The relationship between firms’ voluntary strategy disclosures and the cost of equity
capital is a field of considerable interest both in economic theory and in managerial
practice. However, due to the qualitative and subjective nature of strategy
information, it is not obvious that increased disclosure levels enhance investor
decision-making and are therefore associated with a reduced cost of equity capital
or other variables, namely bid–ask spreads and trading volumes. Our research sheds
light on this matter, revealing that investors do not simply dismiss voluntary
strategy disclosures embedded in the management report as a mandatory part of
firms’ financial reporting package as cheap talk. Instead, we find that, on average,
higher levels of voluntary strategy disclosure are associated with a lower cost of
equity capital, lower bid–ask spreads and higher trading volumes. Our results thus
support the theoretical notion that external investors face a reduced estimation risk
in valuing firms and therefore accept lower returns o their investment when
provided with useful information on a firm’s strategy.
Our results remain stable throughout a number of robustness checks. We ensure
the compliance of our models with premises of linear regressions and find no
indication that could materially change our results. We are also able to provide
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evidence that the cost of capital effect of voluntary strategy disclosure is
incremental and not just a spurious correlation without economic substance, e.g.,
simply resulting from overall disclosure quality.
Even so, some limitations have to be taken into account. First, our study is
limited to 700 firm-year observations collected from 2002 to 2008 from German
listed firms. In order to increase the generalizability of our results, further avenues
of research are suggested. For example, an extended timeline (especially including
the crisis years of 2009 and beyond) could yield additional insights into the
relevance of strategy disclosures for investor decision-making under different
economic conditions. Future research could also address a sample chosen from a
broader population of firms, e.g., from all listed firms or even all those preparing a
management report, or covering other countries with similar accounting traditions,
such as Austria. Another extension of our research could, for example, include the
potential (in)stability of levels of voluntary strategy disclosures (Depoers and
Jeanjean 2012).
In spite of all our efforts to validate the SDS, our self-constructed measure is still
subject to the inherent flaws and drawbacks of such an instrument. Additional
insights can also be expected from studying changes in strategy disclosure levels
over time and their association with the cost of equity capital. Also, our analysis
focuses purely on the impact of information on strategy itself, but did not survey the
specific content of information disclosed. Thus, we may expect differences in
capital market reactions to strategy disclosures depending on the direction of the
particular strategy a given firm discloses.
As a final limitation to our results, we remain cautious in the light of some
unexpected signs for some control variables. We can only speculate as to why some
relationships turned out to have the opposite signs to what we had expected.
Nonetheless, given their nature as controls in highly controlled settings, we strongly
believe that their relevance should not be overestimated. However, further research
is necessary to enhance our understanding of the overall behavior, as well as the
interactions between these control variables.
Nonetheless, a careful reflection of our results yields some useful practical
implications. First, the observed association between disclosure levels and cost
of equity capital is relevant to managers attempting to increase their firm’s
market value and/or residual profitability, e.g., before new equity capital is
raised (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Thus, the beneficial cost of equity capital effect
might set off potential disadvantages of voluntary strategy disclosures, e.g.,
proprietary costs resulting from competitors exploiting a firm’s strategy
disclosures to their own benefit, or simply resulting from the cost of providing
a comprehensive strategy report. Voluntary strategy disclosure in the manage-
ment report can also be considered a means of actively influencing trading
volumes or bid–ask spreads as part of an investor relations strategy, e.g., to
attract institutional investors (Bushee and Miller 2012). Even though the
magnitude of this effect not only depends on the level of strategy disclosure, but
also on the revealed nature of a firm’s strategy, which has not been addressed in
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our analysis, strategy disclosure per se can generally be considered advanta-
geous. This aspect might especially be underestimated in Germany, as the
specific institutional setting of a ‘code law’ country somewhat negatively
influences firms’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of voluntary strategy
disclosure (La Porta et al. 1998, Ball et al. 2000, 2003).
Second, our analysis may also support the future assessment of regulating
strategy disclosures in a capital-market oriented framework, which in recent
years has already been discussed by standard-setters on various occasions (Gu
and Li 2007). One the one hand, both the ASCG, as the German private
standard-setter, as well as the IASB, have emphasized the importance of
reporting on strategy-related matters in the group management report given the
information function of group management reporting and the decision-usefulness
of strategy-related reporting elements in the past. On the other hand, until today,
neither standard-setters has yet issued any regulations on mandatory strategy
reporting. Neither the German GAS 20–Management Report becoming effective
in 2013, nor IASB’s Practice Statement Management Commentary issued in
2010 provide any regulations on strategy disclosure beyond a concise and non-
binding disclosure framework.
Given that our results reveal that strategy disclosures are indeed a relevant
source of information for investors, a connection can be made in the literature
on voluntary vs. mandatory disclosure. This literature suggests that in some
cases not only private benefits, but also positive externalities and thus increasing
welfare may result from increased disclosure levels (Dye 1990; Admati and
Pfleiderer 2000; Lambert et al. 2007). In the latter case, making such disclosures
mandatory should be considered if firms are not motivated otherwise to make
voluntary disclosures, e.g., because private costs (in the case of strategy
disclosure these would be, for example, proprietary costs from negative
competitor interaction or costs of preparing strategy reporting) offset private
benefits (e.g., a reduction of the cost of equity capital). Even though our results
do neither indicate whether any positive externalities from strategy disclosures
exist, nor whether or not they are outweighed by negative consequences, e.g.,
reducing firms’ potential to give separating signals by providing (or not)
voluntary information, our analysis at least provides evidence of the relevance of
strategy disclosures with respect to investor decision-making. Therefore, further
research along these lines can be recommended in order to provide useful
arguments for future standard-setting projects addressing the management report/
MD&A.
This notion is also supported by the observation that even though the extent of
strategy disclosure generally increases over time, the large variation of SDS in our
sample between 2002 and 2008 does not indicate that firms in general tend to
disclose their strategies comprehensively. In other words, even though firms tend to
benefit from high levels of voluntary strategy disclosure, this does not yet lead to an
unravelling of strategy information (Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981)—at least not
in our sample of 700 firm-year observations.
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Finally, it seems to be relevant that our results were obtained under the specific
setting of German accounting regulations, which, in contrast to the IFRS, requires
management reports as a mandatory part of the firm’s audited financial reporting
package. Accordingly, our results also confirm the warnings of Benston et al. (2006)
with regard to a single global set of accounting standards which would leave no
discretionary freedom for standard-setters and thus, no playing-field for diverging
and competing accounting solutions as a rich source of innovation in financial
accounting and reporting.
9 Executive summary
Why should firms share information on business strategy with investors? Even
though strategy information is per se supposed to be relevant for investor decision-
making, it is usually not verifiable. Therefore, such information might be dubbed as
mere ‘cheap talk’ and consequently be ignored by investors. Additionally, firms
might refrain from voluntarily disclosing strategy information in order to keep
competitors sufficiently in the dark on any aspired course of action.
It is therefore debatable whether voluntary strategy disclosures really have a
beneficial impact on the cost of equity capital. To shed light on this issue, our
paper empirically investigates a sample of German listed firms from 2002 to
2008. We first identify the level of voluntary strategy disclosure in firms’
management reports as a part of the mandatory financial reporting package. We
use a hand-collected index to measure firm-specific strategy disclosure scores
(SDS) and then relate these scores to the implied cost of equity capital, using
OLS regression analysis.
Our findings indicate that higher levels of voluntary strategy disclosure are on
average associated with a lower cost of equity capital, higher trading volumes
and lower bid–ask spreads, even after controlling for overall disclosure quality.
There are two major contributions from our results. First, firms seem to be better
off considering the cost of equity capital, trading volumes and bid–ask spreads,
when they provide rather more than less information on their strategy.
Therefore, firms should carefully assess their decisions on the level of voluntary
strategy disclosures in the context of investor relations. Second, our analysis
contributes to the standard-setting debate insofar as—beyond the above-
mentioned private benefits—our results can be regarded as a first step towards
identifying social welfare effects which may result, for instance, if voluntary
disclosure not only reduce a firm’s individual CAPM beta, but also the market-
risk premium itself.
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Appendix 1: Regulation on management reporting/MD&A with respect
to strategy disclosure in Germany
According to German GAAP, German firms must complement their financial
statements with a management report providing information related to the firm’s
future prospects which is potentially of great interest to investors (par. 289 and 315
HGB). The HGB (Handelsgesetzbuch) represents the legal core of the German
GAAP and contains the requirement for firms to provide a management report in the
financial statements. For example, a firm’s management report must fairly present
the firm’s operations, including the operating results and business conditions.
Furthermore, it must ‘assess and explain the company’s probable future develop-
ment together with all associated material risks and opportunities’. Firms must also
provide details of their financial and risk management, as well as with respect to
their research and development activities.
Moreover, par. 315a HGB requires that even capital-market-oriented German
firms that are subject to the EU Regulation 1606/2002 and consequently prepare
their group financial statements according to IFRS, still have to provide a group
management report based on the above-mentioned German GAAP.
In addition to the HGB regulations, the ASCG (or DRSC, i.e., Deutsches
Rechnungslegungs Standards Committee) has developed recommendations for the
application of par. 315 HGB. GAS 15—Management Reporting was issued in 2004
and will be superseded by GAS 20 from 2013 onwards. As our sampling period runs
from 2002 to 2008, GAS 15 is the relevant standard for our analysis. Yet, neither
par. 315 HGB nor GAS 15 (nor any other regulation in German GAAP, including
the new GAS 20) require firms to provide any strategy disclosures. Therefore,
German firms that publish strategic information in the management report, do so
entirely on a voluntary basis.
Under IFRS, there is also no requirement to provide strategy information. Firms
that provide a management report under IFRS may (but are not obliged to do so)
adhere to the Practice Statement Management Commentary that was issued only in
2010, after our sampling period.
Appendix 2: Explanation of variables and data sources
See Table 14.
Appendix 3: Qualitative sample structure
See Table 15.
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Appendix 4: Criteria catalogue underlying the measurement of SDS
See Table 16.
Table 16 Criteria catalogue underlying the measurement of SDS





I 1 Political/social/legal environment
Relevant environment of corporation
Status and assumptions on future development
2 6 (15 % of 40
items)
2 Macro-economic environment
Relevant macro-economic environment of
corporation
Status and assumptions on future development
2
3 Strategic position of corporation
Overall economic situation of corporation




II 1 Market environment
Relevant market addressed by business
Quantification of current market volume/market split
Status and assumptions on future development
Consolidation of key development trends
Quantification of future market development
5 14 (35 %)
2 Competitive environment
Relevant competitive environment/key competitors
Quantification of competition setup (market shares)
Competitive situation in respective market
Key success factors
Assumption on future development of competition
5
3 Strategic position of business
Financial position of business
Position of business in the market (comp. advantage)
Key competencies relevant for market success
Key internal resources as a basis for competencies
4
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Appendix 5: Robustness check using weights in SDS
Whether or not the 40 (35) items that we identified as representing a comprehensive
and systematic strategy disclosure, should be equally weighted or not, is a key issue.
Spero (1979) as well as Meek et al. (1995) recommend equally weighted items so as
to avoid subjectivity. This advice is in line with the bulk of the disclosure literature
(Gray et al. 1995; Hossain et al. 1995; Botosan 1997; Hail 2002; Vanstraelen et al.
Table 16 continued
Strategy disclosure items No. of items
Category Sub-category Sub-category
Strategy definition and detailing
Corporate
strategy
III 1 Overall strategic orientation
Vision of corporation
Mission statement
2 5 (12.5 %)
2 Strategic goals of corporation
Overall strategic development objectives
Quantification of long-term revenue objectives




IV 1 Strategic goals of business
Overall strategic development objectives
Quantification of long-term revenue objectives
Quantification of long-term profitability objectives
3 10 (25 %)
2 Details on business strategy
Strategic position of business/differentiation factors
Key strategic markets in status quo
Markets for future growth
Key strategic products/services in status quo
Products/services for future growth
Key investment programs to achieve strategic
objectives




V 1 Communication to/motivation of staff
Availability/description of firm-wide management
system
Reflection of strategic objectives in incentive
systems
2 5 (12.5 %)
2 Realization of strategy
Condensed formulation of strategy for
communication
Key implementation programs running/setup
Status of ongoing strategic programs and update on
achievability of objectives
3
Sum 40 (100 %)
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2003; or Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2006). Following this literature, we have therefore
decided not to adjust weights for some items for the following reasons:
First, there is no sound theoretical or empirical basis from which we could
reliably derive such weights. Second, firms rather seem to choose one ‘reporting
strategy’ and consistently pursue it across all reporting channels and information
aspects, so that the specific weight of each individual item is not fundamental. As
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006: 466) point out, ‘‘… a measure of disclosure level
produced by examining any one aspect of corporate reporting could proxy for the
general level of disclosure provided by a firm’’. Therefore, we postulate that strategy
reporting needs to comprise all categories defined together, as strategy needs to be
considered in a holistic fashion in order to satisfy the information requirements of
investors. Thus, we assume that our results will not change materially by changing
the weights of either individual items or entire categories in SDS. This is already
justified by the correlation analysis of the sub-scores of SDS presented in Table 5 in
the main body of our paper.
To explore this issue further, we have repeated our main analyses with modified
SDS in which the implementation items (i.e., relating to communication, motivation
and strategy realization) were weighted double relative to all other items. The
results are reported below (with the first two lines giving the results of our three
measurement models as reported, whereas the last two lines show the results after
using doubly-weighted implementation items). As can be seen, the results do not
change materially (Table 17).
Table 17 Comparison of model results
Model Criterion Symbol CC BAS TV
Models as reported Determination R2 adj. 0.371 0.779 0.846






p value (0.004) (0.046) (0.000)
Double-weight implementation
items in SDS
Determination R2 adj. 0.370 0.672 0.845








p value (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
SDS is the annual strategy disclosure score. SDS (double) is the annual strategy disclosure score cal-
culated with double weights on implementation items. CC is the natural logarithm of an implied ex-ante
cost of equity capital rate. BAS is the natural logarithm of annual mean average relative bid–ask spreads.
TV is the natural logarithm of the aggregated annual monetary trading volume of a firm’s shares
Regression coefficients are standardized. The p values (F values) noted (in parentheses) are for a two-tail
test of statistical significance; * (**; ***) indicate statistical significance at the p \ 0.10 (0.05; 0.01) level
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Appendix 6: SDS measurement results for our sample of 700 firm-years
See Table 18.
Table 18 SDS measurement results for our sample of 700 firm-years
Strategy disclosure scores
[Standardized, {0;1}] 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 YoY Change
Adidas 0.23 0.35 0.28 0.38 0.60 0.65 0.55 ? – ? ? ? –
Aixtron 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.43 = ? ? ? ? ?
Arcandor 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.30 0.28 0.18 ? – = – – –
Aurubis 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.63 0.45 0.45 ? = = ? – =
Axel Springer 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.58 – ? – ? ? ?
BASF 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.68 0.48 ? ? = ? ? –
Bayer 0.35 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.60 0.50 ? = = ? ? –
BayWa 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.33 – ? ? = – ?
Bechtle 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.40 0.33 = ? ? – ? –
Beiersdorf 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.35 – – ? ? ? =
Bertrandt 0.08 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.18 0.15 ? – = ? – –
Bilfinger Berger 0.13 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.43 0.40 ? ? ? ? ? –
Biotest 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.35 0.35 0.43 0.40 ? ? ? = ? –
BMW 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.23 ? – ? – ? –
Carl Zeiss Meditec 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.28 ? = ? ? – ?
Celesio 0.18 0.15 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.35 0.38 – ? – ? ? ?
Centrotec Sustainable 0.28 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.58 0.60 0.63 ? = – ? ? ?
CeWe Color Holding 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 – – – = ? =
Continental 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.58 0.50 0.60 0.55 = ? ? – ? –
CTS Eventim 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.15 – ? = ? – =
Curanum 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.34 = = ? ? – =
Daimler 0.63 0.45 0.43 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.55 – – ? ? ? –
Deutsche Lufthansa 0.33 0.38 0.28 0.38 0.43 0.73 0.70 ? – ? ? ? –
Deutsche Post 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.63 0.75 0.73 – ? = ? ? –
Deutsche Telekom 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.50 0.63 0.63 ? ? ? – ? =
Deutz 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.45 0.48 0.43 – ? ? ? ? –
Douglas Holding 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.33 = ? ? ? = –
Dra¨gerwerk 0.28 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.33 ? – ? ? ? –
Du¨rr 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.28 0.45 0.43 = – – ? ? –
Dyckerhoff 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.28 – = ? = – =
E.On 0.38 0.30 0.43 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.53 – ? ? – ? =
Elexis 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.25 ? – ? – ? =
ElringKlinger 0.25 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.30 0.28 ? – ? ? – –
Escada 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.38 0.35 0.25 – = ? ? – –
Fielmann 0.37 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.34 ? – ? ? ? –




[Standardized, {0;1}] 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 YoY Change
Fraport 0.28 0.28 0.38 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.55 = ? ? = ? =
Fresenius Med. Care 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.75 0.83 0.83 = ? ? ? ? =
Fresenius 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.28 0.35 0.30 = – ? – ? –
Fuchs Petrolub 0.23 0.20 0.14 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.31 – – ? ? = –
GEA Group 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.28 – – – = ? –
Gerry Weber 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.29 = = ? – ? –
Gesco 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.13 ? ? ? = ? –
GfK 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.53 0.43 0.43 0.38 = ? ? – = –
Gildemeister 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.50 0.53 0.45 ? = ? ? ? –
Grammer 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.23 0.18 – ? – ? – –
H & R Wasag 0.15 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.50 0.45 ? ? ? ? ? –
HeidelbergCement 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.28 – – ? – = =
Heideldruck 0.35 0.43 0.38 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.45 ? – ? – = =
Henkel 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.48 0.48 0.48 ? = ? ? = =
Hochtief 0.33 0.35 0.45 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.43 ? ? ? – = –
Hugo Boss 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.33 = ? ? = ? ?
IDS Scheer 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.25 ? – ? ? ? –
Infineon Technologies 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.28 = – = ? ? –
Jenoptik 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.48 = ? ? ? ? –
Jungheinrich 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.29 0.26 – – ? – ? –
K ? S 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50 ? – ? = = –
Koenig & Bauer 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.20 ? – ? = ? –
Kontron 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.26 – – – ? ? =
Krones 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.33 – = – = ? –
Kuka 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.38 0.58 0.45 = ? ? – ? –
KWS Saat 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.20 = ? = – = ?
Leoni 0.23 0.20 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.40 – ? ? = ? –
Linde 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.38 ? = – = ? =
Loewe 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.31 = – = – ? –
MAN 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.43 0.38 = ? ? ? – –
MediGene 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.30 = – = ? – =
Medion 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.33 ? = – ? = =
Merck 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.33 ? = ? ? = –
Metro 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 ? = ? = – =
MorphoSys 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.53 – ? ? ? ? =
MVV Energie 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 ? = ? = = =
Nordex 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.37 0.37 – ? = ? ? =
Pfeiffer Vacuum 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.29 0.29 ? – ? – ? =
Pfleiderer 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.40 0.58 0.50 0.48 ? = – ? – –
ProSiebenSat.1 Media 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.40 ? ? ? ? ? –
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Appendix 7: Validation of SDS with BAR scores
One way in which we validate our measures SDS is by computing the correlation
with another measure of strategy disclosure. If both measures are valid, we should
observe a positive correlation between the two scores. As there are no viable
archival data on strategy disclosure for our sample of firm-years in Germany, we
construct such an alternative measure by using data collected from the yearly
German annual report competition ‘Best Annual Report’ (BAR).
In this competition, annual reports of listed firms are subject to a comprehensive
content analysis based on more than 300 items referring to the overall annual
financial reporting package of German listed firms (Baetge 1992). The checklist
used in the annual report competition has been compiled and continuously
developed since the middle of the 1990s, on the basis of several empirical surveys
Table 18 continued
Strategy disclosure scores
[Standardized, {0;1}] 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 YoY Change
Puma 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.31 ? ? ? – – –
QSC 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.40 ? = ? ? ? =
Rational 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.34 ? ? = ? = –
Rheinmetall 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.28 = ? ? ? – –
Rho¨n-Klinikum 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.23 = ? = ? = =
RWE 0.28 0.18 0.33 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.55 – ? ? ? ? =
Salzgitter 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.38 = ? ? ? = –
SAP 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.40 ? ? ? ? ? –
SGL Carbon 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.48 0.48 ? = = ? ? =
Siemens 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.28 0.40 0.48 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Singulus Tech 0.37 0.43 0.40 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.26 ? – – – ? –
Sixt 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.43 0.38 ? ? = ? ? –
Software 0.20 0.23 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.55 0.50 ? ? = ? ? –
SolarWorld 0.30 0.28 0.38 0.48 0.58 0.68 0.65 – ? ? ? ? –
Solon 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.28 = = ? ? ? –
Stada Arzneimittel 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.38 = = ? = ? –
Su¨dzucker 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.23 ? ? ? ? ? –
Takkt 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.30 0.25 ? = = ? ? –
ThyssenKrupp 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.48 0.53 0.48 = ? = ? ? –
TUI 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.33 ? – ? = – –
United Internet 0.35 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.40 ? – = – = =
VBH Holding 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.17 = ? = = ? –
Volkswagen 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.45 ? = – ? ? =
Vossloh 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.40 = – ? = ? =
Wirecard 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.26 0.43 0.43 ? ? ? ? ? =
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involving fund managers and financial analysts and is thus based on empirical data
(e.g., Prigge 2006).
As there is no sub-score for strategy disclosure in the original ‘Best Annual
Report’ database, we identified 30 items generally related to strategy disclosure in
the management report in order to calculate alternative strategy disclosure scores
which we refer to as ‘BAR scores’. As these BAR scores generally reflect the same
information as the SDS, both should yield strong statistical associations (Table 19).
This notion is supported by the table above, for both correlating scores and ranks,
the latter again as a robustness check. For example, Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient of SDS and BAR scores is 0.560 at a 1 percent level of significance (two-
tailed).
Even though the BAR scores are appropriate as a validation instrument, we
regard them as too noisy and therefore unsuitable for our original analysis in the
main body of our paper, for several reasons. First, the ‘Best Annual Report’
database measures issues of strategy disclosure only indirectly and therefore not
systematically and comprehensively. Second, the underlying construction method-
ology of BAR has been subject to several changes in measurement over time and
scores awarded at different points in time may thus not indicate the same
information content. Third, BAR scores are not available for all firm-year
observations in our sample.
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